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Abstract:  Theoretical frameworks in which consciousness is an inherent property of the neuron 
must account for the contrast between conscious and unconscious processes in the brain and 
address how neural events can ever be unconscious if consciousness is a property of all neurons. 
Other approaches have sought answers regarding consciousness by contrasting conscious and 
unconscious processes and through investigating the complex interactions between the two kinds 
of processes, as occurs most notably in human voluntary action. In voluntary action, 
consciousness is associated most, not with motor control or low-level perceptual processing, but 
with the stage of processing known as action selection. 
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Reber (2016) introduces a thoughtful, counterintuitive approach to the problem of how 
consciousness emerges from biological events. The approach is progressive in several ways, 
including that it is descriptive (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be rather 
than as they should be) and focuses on the most basic and presumably most tractable forms of 
conscious processing. 
When adopting such a descriptive standpoint, it is evident that, in the nervous system, 
there are neural events that are associated with conscious processing and neural events that 
are not at all associated with conscious processing. Thus, in every field of study in psychology 
and in neuroscience, there exists the distinction between conscious and unconscious processes. 
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(Passive Frame Theory attempts to explain, as parsimoniously as possible, the difference 
between conscious and unconscious processes; Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, Krieger, & Gazzaley, in 
press.) For example, in perception research, there exists the distinction between supraliminal 
and subliminal; in memory research, there is the contrast between explicit and implicit 
processes. Similarly, in research on motor cognition and on language, the conscious aspects of 
voluntary action or of speech production are contrasted with the unconscious aspects of, for 
example, motor programming and syntax. Various fields also contrast “controlled” processes 
(which tend to be conscious) and “automatic” processes (which are often unconscious). In 
addition, in neuroscience, there is a growing consensus (Morsella et al., in press) that 
consciousness is associated with only a subset of all the processes and regions of the nervous 
system. This subset of processes seems to be qualitatively distinct from its unconscious 
counterparts in physical makeup/organization or functioning. Complex forms of unconscious 
processes can be found at all stages of processing, including low-level perceptual analysis, 
semantic-conceptual processing, and motor programming (Morsella & Bargh, 2011). Dramatic 
forms of unconscious processing are found in cases in which the entire stimulus-response arc is 
mediated unconsciously, as in the case of some reflexes and automatisms (e.g., in neurological 
conditions). Theorists who propose that consciousness is an inherent property of the nerve cell, 
or of all matter (as in panpsychism), must account for the contrast between conscious and 
unconscious processes and explain how neural events can ever be unconscious if consciousness 
is a property of all nerve cells. In short, do such theoretical frameworks allow for the existence 
of unconscious neural processes? 
Faced with this challenge, proponents of such accounts could posit that cells associated 
with unconscious processes (e.g., peristalsis and the pupillary reflex) are really not unconscious 
but, instead, have a form of consciousness that is impoverished or otherwise different from 
normal human consciousness. But now a new problem arises, one that is no less difficult than, 
and may be one and the same as, the “hard problem” of consciousness. This is because a 
proponent of the view that consciousness is an inherent property of the nerve cell must then 
explain why there exists a contrast between this strange, newly-identified form of 
consciousness (which occupies most of nervous function, including activities in the enteric 
nervous system) and normal consciousness (e.g., explicit processes and subjectively-
experienced pain). It could be argued that the latter involves neural circuitry with different 
properties, perhaps more complex than the former. But it remains mysterious what these 
properties and the other differences between the two kinds of consciousness are. Addressing 
this issue would be tantamount to explaining how neural circuits generate conscious processing. 
 
Alternative Approaches to the Study of Consciousness 
 
To solve the riddle of consciousness and the brain, perhaps the lowest hanging fruit is to 
explain the contrast between conscious and unconscious processes within adult humans, who, 
unlike single-celled organisms, can reliably self-report their conscious experiences. At present, 
in humans there are many contrasts (e.g., the pupillary reflex versus conscious pain) that remain 
difficult to explain. Current approaches that have granted that unconscious processes do exist 
have begun to look for answers by contrasting conscious and unconscious processes and by 
investigating the complex interactions between the two kinds of processes, as occurs most 
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notably in human voluntary action. Voluntary action depends on the complex interplay between 
a medley of conscious and unconscious processes. For example, of all the stages of processing 
that lead to an overt behavior in response to an external stimulus, it seems that consciousness 
is associated most with what has been regarded as the “central process” of action selection 
(Proctor & Vu, 2010). Consciousness is not as closely associated with motor control, which is 
mostly unconscious, or with low-level perceptuo-semantic analysis, which is mostly consciously-
impenetrable (Morsella et al., in press). With a descriptive approach, detecting the contrast 
between conscious and unconscious processes in the human nervous system is somewhat 
inevitable (Morsella & Poehlman, 2013). Positing that consciousness is an inherent property of 
nerve cells, or of physical matter, does not at this stage of understanding illuminate this 
enigmatic contrast. 
Even if consciousness is a property of the cell, the question remains, What is it about the 
cell that gives it the properties associated with consciousness? Such a question is far more 
daunting than what non-experts may surmise: Investigators focusing on consciousness are not 
only incapable of having an inkling regarding how something like consciousness could arise from 
something like cells or brain circuitry, they cannot even begin to fathom how something like 
consciousness could emerge from any set of real or hypothetical circumstances. Reber’s 
thoughtful framework provides a descriptive, falsifiable, and intellectually stimulating 
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